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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Roy Roland Araiza appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance and challenges the district court's order denying his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained from his person and belongings after he 
was observed breaking into his mother's house 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinas 
The uncontested facts underlying Araiza's charge for possession of a 
controlled substance (R., pp.4-5) are as follows: 
At approximately 1l:OO p.m. on December 3, 2006, Officers 
Dennis Clark of the Jerome City Police Department was patrolling 
on East Avenue F when he saw a male subject standing at a 
window of a residence. To Officer Clark, it appeared that the 
individual had either just left through the window or was attempting 
to enter the residence. Officer Clark stopped his vehicle and 
looked around the residence for the individual. When he could not 
find anyone, he knocked on the door of the residence. An elderly 
woman, later identified as Mary Mosqueda, answered and told the 
officer that the individual was inside the residence, .... [Footnote 
omitted] Officer Clark asked to speak to him. The individual came 
to the door and identified himself as Roland Araiza but said people 
called him Roy. Araiza did not have any identification but gave 
Officer Clark his social security number and his date of birth. 
Araiza admitted that he was at the window earlier. While Clark was 
talking to Araiza, Officer Baker of the Jerome Police Department 
arrived to assist. While Officer Clark returned to his vehicle to run a 
check with information given by Araiza, Office[r] Baker stayed at the 
door of the house with Araiza. While at the door, Araiza[, who had 
come to the door only wearing jeans, which were unzipped (Tr., 
p.10, Ls.11-14),] asked if he could go and put some clothes on. 
Officer Baker permitted him to do so at which time Ariaza went 
back into the residence and closed the door. Officer Clark ran the 
check, but was unable to confirm the individual[']s identification with 
the information he had been given. When Clark returned to the 
house, Baker was standing at the closed door. The officers 
knocked, but no one answered the door and it was locked. 
A female subject who lived to the west of the ... residence 
then arrived. She identified herself as the daughter of Mary 
Mosqueda, the owner of the house. The daughter told the officers 
that there should be no one in the residence except Ms. Mosqueda 
and her two young grandchildren. When shown the name of the 
defendant, Ms. Mosqueda said that she did not know anyone by 
that name. The officers kept knocking on the door and windows of 
the residence and also had the daughter attempt to telephone Ms. 
Mosqueda, but no one inside the residence would respond. A 
young man then drove up to the house, later identified as Ms. 
Mosqueda's grandson. He also told the officers that he didn't 
recognize the name of the subject in the house and that no one 
should have been in the house except his grandmother. Officer 
Clark testified that at this point the officer's were concerned for the 
safety of the individuals in the house because no one should have 
been in the house except Ms. Mosqueda and her two grandchildren 
and no one recognized the name of the man the officers had seen 
outside of a window earlier that evening. The officers then made 
forcible entry into the home. 
(R., pp.27-29; see also R., pp.6-11.) The officers found the defendant in the 
back bedroom with Ms. Mosqueda. (R., p.29.) Araiza was arrested for 
obstructing a police investigation and the officers asked if Araiza had any clothing 
that should go with him. (R., p.29.) Ms. Mosqueda took the officers to another 
bedroom and pointed to a jacket and a white leather bag on the floor, unzipped 
and open, with a glass pipe with burn residue clearly visible. (R., p.29.) A 
search of the bag revealed numerous watches, jewelry, rings, more drug 
paraphernalia and methamphetamine. (R., p.29.) 
Araiza was charged with a felony, possession of methamphetamine under 
I.C. 3 37-2732(c)(l), and a misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia 
under I.C. 5 37-2734A. (R., pp.4-5, 16-17.) Araiza waived his preliminary 
hearing and was bound over to the district court on both charges. (R., pp.14, 
Araiza filed a motion to suppress, asserting the officers did not have a 
search warrant and there was no exigent circumstance justifying warrantless 
entry into his mother's home (R., pp.21-22), which the district court denied 
following a hearing (R., pp.27-34; Tr., pp.4-69). Araiza entered a conditional 
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.41-42.) The district court ordered a 
presentence investigation report. (R., pp.43-44.) At the sentencing hearing, after 
reviewing the presentence report and arguments of counsel, the district court 
sentenced Araiza to seven years in prison, with one year fixed. (R., pp.53-59.) 
The state moved to dismiss the misdemeanor charge, which the district court 
granted. (R., p.60.) Araiza filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.63-65.) 
ISSUES 
Araiza states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Araiza's motion to suppress 
the warrantless entry into his residence and arrest of his person in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution? 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Ms. Mosqueda's daughter and grandson did not recognize the name of the man, 
Roy Roland Araiza, with Ms. Mosqueda and two of her grandchildren in her 
home. Ms. Mosqueda, her grandchildren, and Araiza did not respond to 
repeated telephone calls and knocks at the doors and windows. Should this 
Court affirm the district court's order denying Araiza's motion to suppress 
because, in light of the facts, exigent circumstances justified the entry into Ms. 
Mosqueda's home to ensure her and her grandchildren's safety and there was 
probable cause to arrest Araiza? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctlv Concluded That The Entw Into Ms. Mosqueda's 
House Was Justified Under The Exigent Circumstances Exception To The 
Warrant Requirement 
A. Introduction 
Araiza claims that Ms. Mosqueda was not in any distress and that she told 
the officers that the man outside one of her windows was her son. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.12-13.) Araiza contends the district court erred in determining, "based 
on testimony from the officers that they were concerned for the welfare of Ms. 
Mosqueda and the children in the residence, and the testimony from Officer Clark 
that two relatives allegedly could not identify Mr. Araiza's name, the officers' 
actions were appropriate and an exigent circumstance existed." (Appellant's 
brief, pp.10-11.) Contrary to Araiza's contention, the district court properly 
considered the testimony of the officers and Ms. Mosqueda, and found Ms. 
Mosqueda's testimony that she told the officers the subject was her son was not 
reliable because she was "on a lot of medication at the time due to surgery and 
could not remember the details of the incident too well." (R., p.28, n.1.) Relying 
on the officers' testimony, the district court also found Araiza had told his mother 
not to respond to the officers' knocks at the doors and windows. (R., pp.32-33.) 
The district court's factual findings are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. The district court concluded that the police had reason to believe that 
Araiza had unlawfully entered Ms. Mosqueda's home and was preventing her 
and her grandchildren from responding to attempts to contact them, creating an 
exigent circumstance. The relevant factual findings of the district court are not 
challenged as clearly erroneous on appeal. Rather, the district court's factual 
findings are supported by the evidence. Likewise, the district court's conclusions 
are supported by the application of the relevant law to the facts it found. Thus, 
the district court properly denied Araiza's motion to suppress. 
5. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a motion to suppress is bifurcated. State v. 
m, 135 ldaho 273, 275, 16 P.3d 949, 951 (Ct. App. 2000). The standard of 
appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of deference to factual 
findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether 
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. 
v. Julian, 129 ldaho 133, 135, 922 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1996); State v. Atkinson, 
128 ldaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). On a denial of a 
motion to suppress the appellate court will overturn a trial court's factual findings 
only if they are clearly erroneous. Doe v. State, 131 ldaho 851, 853, 965 P.2d 
816, 818 (1998). In addition, the appellate court gives due deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
m, 131 ldaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641,644 (1998). 
C. The District Court Correctlv Aaplied The Law To The Facts In Concludinq 
Exiqent Circumstances Justified the Warrantless Entrv Into Ms. 
Mosqueda's Home 
1. The Exiaent Circumstances Exceation To The Warrant 
Requirement Applies Where The Facts Known To The Police, With 
Reasonable Inferences Drawn From Those Facts. Would "Warrant 
A Man Of Reasonable Caution In The Belief' That The Action 
Taken Was Aparopriate 
Although warrantless searches are presumed to violate the Fourth 
Amendment. because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
"reasonableness," the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. 
Briqham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Exigent circumstances, 
such as to "fight a fire and investigate its cause, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 
I 509, . . . (1 978), to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, Ker v. California, 
I 
I 
374 U.S. 23, 40, ... (1963), or to engage in 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect, 
I United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, ... (1976), is a recognized 
i 
I 
exception to the warrant requirement." Id_ at 403. Police also do not need a 
warrant when they reasonably believe there is a compelling need for official 
action and no time to secure a warrant, such as when there is a risk of danger to 
persons inside a building. Id. at 403; State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 
849, 41 P.3d 275, 277 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Michiqan v. Tvler, 436 U.S. 499, 
509 (1978); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)); see also Georaia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118, (2006) ("[lit would be silly to suggest that the 
police would commit a tort by entering ... to determine whether violence (or threat 
of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur") (quoted in 
Br i~ham Citv, Utah, 547 U.S. at 403-404). A court evaluating a claim that exigent 
circumstances justified a warrantless search should determine whether the facts 
known to the police, with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, would 
"warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 
appropriate. Pearson-Anderson, 136 ldaho at 850,41 P.3d at 278 (citing State v. 
Monroe, 101 ldaho 251, 254, 611 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1980) (quoting Terrv v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968))). "An action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth 
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action." Scott v. United States, 
436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). Courts should avoid second-guessing police 
decisions made in legitimate belief that life may very well be at stake. Pearson- 
Anderson, 136 ldaho at 850, 41 P.3d at 278 (citing Monroe, 101 ldaho at 255, 
611 P.2d at 1040; State v. Wiedenheft, 136 ldaho 14, 16, 27 P.3d 873, 875 (Ct. 
App. 2001)). 
2. The District Court's Factual Findinas Are Supported By Substantial 
And Competent Evidence 
In this case on December 3, 2006, and 11:OO p.m., Jerome Police Officer 
Dennis Clark was driving his patrol car when he saw a man in dark clothing 
standing at the rear window of a residence apparently entering or leaving. (Tr., 
p.6, Ls.15-21.) Officer Clark drove past the residence again, but was unable to 
locate the man (Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.l); so he called for assistance (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.3-5). Officer Clark knocked on the door of the residence and an elderly 
woman, later identified as Mary Mosqueda, answered. (Tr., p.7, L.10 - p.8, L.2.) 
Ms. Mosqueda indicated she was okay and the man who had been outside her 
home, Roland who goes by Roy, was now inside. (Tr., p.8, Ls.5-19; p.9, Ls.6-8; 
p.29, L.15-18; p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.1.) At Officer Clark's request, she walked 
back into the house to ask the man to come to the door, where he appeared, 
wearing only unzipped jeans, identified himself as Roland Araiza, added "it's 
actually Roy Araiza," admitted he had been outside at the window, and gave a 
social security number and date of birth. (Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.1 I, L.6; p.31, Ls.12- 
22; p.45, Ls.18-24.) Jerome Police Officer James Baker arrived at the door and 
Officer Clark asked Araiza to stay at the door with Officer Baker while he 
checked Araiza's information. (Tr., p.1 I, Ls.7-10.) After Officer Baked agreed to 
Araiza's request to go get a shirt, Araiza closed the door. (Tr., p.41, Ls.8-14; 
p.13, Ls.15-19.) Officer Clark was unable to confirm Araiza's information. (Tr., 
p.12, Ls.1-5; p.13, Ls.7-13.) 
Officers Clark and Baker knocked on the door, and continued to do so for 
several minutes, but received no response. (Tr., p.13, L.12 - p.14, L.7; p.41, 
L.18-19.) While the officers were knocking, a woman who identified herself as 
Ms. Mosqueda's daughter, approached the officers. (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-12; p.15, 
Ls.3-4; p.34, Ls.19-21.) She said she did not know Roy Araiza and that no one 
should be in the home with her mother other than her own two sleeping children. 
(Tr., p.15, Ls.10-16; p.34, L.22 - p.35, L.5), raising the officer's concern for the 
safety of Ms. Mosqueda and her grandchildren (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-10; p.42, Ls.6-11). 
She tried to call her mother on her cellular telephone and knocked on the door, 
but received no answer. (Tr., p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.1.) A younger man arrived on 
the scene, identifying himself as Ms. Mosqueda's grandson. (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 12-14; 
He also indicated he did not recognize the name "Roy Araiza" and stated that no 
other adult should be in his grandmother's home. (Tr., p.17, Ls.2-5; p.42, Ls.9- 
11 .) 
After several minutes of knocking at the doors and windows and calling 
into the house with no response, although the officers could tell that people were 
in the southwest corner of the house (Tr., p.17, Ls.12-17; p.35, Ls.1-3; p.41, 
Ls.20-24; p.42, Ls.12-23; p.43, Ls.3-4) the officers, concerned that Ms. 
Mosqueda and her grandchildren were in danger and being held against their will 
by Araiza (Tr., p.17, Ls.19-20; p.43, Ls.1-2), decided to break down the door to 
render assistance (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-3; p.43, Ls.4-16, 79-23). 
Upon entering, the officers found Araiza in the southwest corner bedroom 
with Ms. Mosqueda. (Tr., p.18, Ls.9-11.) After Araiza was handcuffed, Ms. 
Mosqueda told the officers Araiza would not let anyone answer the door. (Tr., 
p.19, Ls.7-12.) 
Officer Clark asked Ms. Mosqueda if Araiza had any clothing that should 
go with him, and she led the officer to the opposite bedroom and pointed to a 
coatljacket. (Tr., p.19, Ls.15-24.) Officer Clark asked Ms. Mosqueda if anything 
else belonged to Araiza, since he did not live there, and she pointed to an 
unzipped white leather duffle bag in which a glass pipe with whitish burnt 
methamphetamine-like residue was lying in plain sight. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-15.) The 
officer took the bag to the kitchen and went through the contents, finding watches 
and rings taken from family members, as well as drug paraphernalia, and 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.20, L.17 - p.21, L.8.) The family members identified 
the watches and rings as being stolen from them, but did not want to press 
charges. (Tr., p.21, Ls.4-8.) Officer Clark returned to watches and rings to the 
family members. (Tr., p.21, Ls.4-8.) 
At the jail, Araiza waived his Miranda rights and said the white leather 
duffle bag belonged to his mother and that he was using it to hold things, 
including the drugs and paraphernalia, which he identified as either belonging to 
him or what he had just recently stolen from another residence. (T., p.21, L.15 - 
p.22. L.18.) 
At the suppression hearing, Ms. Mosqueda, who admitted she was under 
a lot of medication and "I can't really remember a lot of stuff' (Tr., p.60, L.23 - 
p.61, L.1), testified that she identified Araiza as her son when the police first 
contacted her (Tr., p.57, Ls.10-14). Ms. Mosqueda also testified that Araiza had 
been living with her since July (Tr., p.53, Ls.2-8), but he did not have a key (Tr., 
p.56, L.23-25) and did not have his own room; he was sleeping in her grandson 
Marky's room (Tr., p.65, Ls.14-25). Ms. Mosqueda's testimony about not 
answering the door or telephone after Araiza shut the door was bizarre; she said 
"I did hear the phone" but "I kept turning it off," and "I just didn't want to be able to 
talk to anybody. I couldn't talk to anybody." (Tr., p.66, L.15 - p.67, L.4.) 
Officer Clark testified he recalled that Ms. Mosqueda, when she answered 
the door, identified Araiza as Roland and Roy, but he did not believe Ms. 
Mosqueda ever identified Araiza as her son. (Tr., p.29, Ls.15-25.) Officer Baker 
testified that Araiza never said he lived in his mother's house. (Tr., p.47, Ls.2- 
18.) Araiza did not testify. 
From the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, the district court 
found the following facts: 
At approximately 11:OO p.m. on December 3, 2006, Officers 
Dennis Clark of the Jerome City Police Department was patrolling 
on East Avenue F when he saw a male subject standing at a 
window of a residence. To Officer Clark, it appeared that the 
individual had either just left through the window or was attempting 
to enter the residence. Officer Clark stopped his vehicle and 
looked around the residence for the individual. When he could not 
find anyone, he knocked on the door of the residence. An elderly 
woman, later identified as Mary Mosqueda, answered and told the 
officer that the individual was inside the residence, but did not 
identify the person.[footnote I ]  Officer Clark asked to speak to him. 
The individual came to the door and identified himself as Roland 
Araiza but said people called him Roy. Araiza did not have any 
identification but gave Officer Clark his social security number and 
his date of birth. Araiza admitted that he was at the window earlier. 
While Clark was talking to Araiza, Officer Baker of the Jerome 
Police Department arrived to assist. While Officer Clark returned to 
his vehicle to run a check with information given by Araiza, Office[r] 
Baker stayed at the door of the house with Araiza. While at the 
door, Araiza[, who had come to the door only wearing jeans, which 
were unzipped (Tr., p.10, Ls.11-14),] asked if he could go and put 
some clothes on. Officer Baker permitted him to do so at which 
time Araiza went back into the residence and closed the door. 
Officer Clark ran the check, but was unable to confirm the 
individual[']s identification with the information he had been given. 
When Clark returned to the house, Baker was standing at the 
closed door. The officers knocked, but no one answered the door 
and it was locked. 
[Footnote 1 text] Ms[.] Mosqueda testified that she told the officer 
that the subject was her son. However, she also testified that she 
was on a lot of medication at the time due to surgery and could not 
remember the details of the incident too well. 
A female subject who lived to the west of the ... residence 
then arrived. She identified herself as the daughter of Mary 
Mosqueda, the owner of the house. The daughter told the officers 
that there should be no one in the residence except Ms. Mosqueda 
and her two young grandchildren. When shown the name of the 
defendant, Ms. Mosqueda said that she did not know anyone by 
that name. The officers kept knocking on the door and windows of 
the residence and also had the daughter attempt to telephone Ms. 
Mosqueda, but no one inside the residence would respond. A 
young man then drove up to the house, later identified as Ms. 
Mosqueda's grandson. He also told the officers that he didn't 
recognize the name of the subject in the house and that no one 
should have been in the house except his grandmother. Officer 
Clark testified that at this point the officer's were concerned for the 
safety of the individuals in the house because no one should have 
been in the house except Ms. Mosqueda and her two grandchildren 
and no one recognized the name of the man the officers had seen 
outside of a window earlier that evening. The officers then made 
forcible entry into the home. Upon entering the home, the officers 
discovered the defendant in a back bedroom with Ms. Mosqueda. 
When asked why she did not answer the door, Ms. Mosqueda told 
the officers that the defendant had told her not to. The officers then 
arrested the defendant for obstructing a police investigation. 
Because the defendant was only wearing a pair of jeans, the 
officers asked Ms. Mosqueda if there were any clothes that they 
could take for the defendant. Ms. Mosqueda took the officers to 
another bedroom and pointed to a jacket. While in the bedroom the 
officers noticed a white leather bag on the floor, unzipped and 
open, with a glass pipe with burn residue clearly visible. Ms. 
Mosqueda said that the bag was the defendant's. A search of the 
bag revealed numerous watches, jewelry, rings, more drug 
paraphernalia and methamphetamine 
(R., pp.27-29; see also R., pp.6-17.) The district court's factual findings are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence 
In light of the foregoing testimony, the district court properly found the 
officer's testimony more credible than Ms. Mosqueda's testimony. "On a 
suppression motion, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial 
court." State v. Dominauez, 137 ldaho 681, 684, 52 P.3d 325, 328 (Ct. App. 
2002). An appellate court will not substitute its view of the credibility of witnesses 
for that of the finder of fact. State v. Robertson, 134 ldaho 180, 185, 997 P.2d 
641, 646 (Ct. App. 2000). Araiza has failed to establish the district court's factual 
findings are clearly erroneous. 
3. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law In Denvina Araiza's 
Motion To Suppress The Evidence Of Druas And Paraphernalia 
Discovered In His Mother's House Where He Had Alleaedlv Been 
Staving 
The district court concluded: 
It is clear from the facts of this case that the officers were 
well justified in their concern for the well-being of the individuals 
inside of the residence given the information before them at the 
time. Officer Clark had seen a man at a window that appeared to 
be trying to enter the residence, the occupants of the house, while 
seeming to be under no distress when the officers first went to the 
door, refused to open the door, answer the phone or respond to the 
knocking on the windows, the daughter and grandson of Ms. 
Mosqueda told the officers that there should be no one in the 
residence except Ms. Mosqueda and her two young grandsons, 
and they also told the officers that they did not recognize the name 
of the man inside the house with Ms. Mosqueda. These facts 
justify the actions of the officers in entering the residence without a 
warrant to ensure the safety of the citizens found within. 
(R., p.31.) The district court's conclusion that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless entry into Ms. Mosqueda's home is consistent with ldaho law. If the 
purpose of the entry is to prevent injury or protect life, then probable cause to 
arrest or search is not required. See e.a. State v. Wiedenhefi, 136 ldaho 14, 16, 
27 P.3d 873, 875 (Ct. App. 2001) (warrantless entry into home justified where 
officers responded to a 911 hang-up call regarding domestic violence and the 
defendant had a red swollen spot on her forehead); State v. Sailas, 129 ldaho 
432, 925 P.2 1131 (Ct. App. 1996) (warrantless entry into defendant's apartment 
was justified by the need to prevent additional injury to defendant's girlfriend and 
injury to her child where police responded to a report of a domestic disturbance 
and it was evident that the two adults had been fighting previously but indicated 
no assistance was needed). In light of Officer Clark's observation of a man at a 
rear window of the home, his disappearance, his appearance at the door wearing 
only unzipped jeans after the home owner called him to the door and, later, the 
homeowner's daughter and grandson telling the police they did not recognize the 
name of the man and that no one should be in the home except the owner and 
her two grandchildren, coupled with the chilling lack of response to the knocks on 
the doors and windows and telephone calls, the officers acted reasonably in 
entering the home without a warrant to ensure that Ms. Mosqueda and her two 
grandchildren were safe. 
D. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
The Officers Had Probable Cause To Arrest Araiza 
Araiza did not challenge his arrest in his motion to suppress (R., pp.21- 
22), and the issue is not relevant to the search of the white duffle bag given that 
Araiza said the white leather duffle bag belonged to his mother and that he was 
using it to hold things, including the drugs and paraphernalia, which he identified 
as either belonging to him or what he had just recently stolen from another 
residence (T., p.21, L.15 - p.22, L.18). Nevertheless, the district court addressed 
the issue, concluding there was probable cause to arrest Araiza for obstructing 
and delaying an officer, I.C. § 18-705. (R., pp.31-33.) 
The trial court correctly applied the law in so concluding. See State v. 
H, 136 Idaho 499, 502, 36 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[tlhe 
requirement of probable cause does not mean that the arresting officer must 
have sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.") "The legality of an arrest is not 
dependent upon the State's failure to successfully prosecute a defendant for the 
suspected crime." 136 ldaho at 502 n.?, 36 P.3d at 1290 n.1. (citing Draper v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312 (1959) and State v. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508, 
51 1, 5 P.3d 488,491 (Ct. App. 2000) (both discussing the difference between the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof and probable cause to arrest)). The 
test is whether "the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a 
prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an 
offense." Id. (internal brackets omitted.) 
The officers were justified in detaining Araiza at the door of the residence 
on suspicion of unlawful entry, I.C. 3 18-7034, and his act of closing the door and 
preventing the Ms. Araiza or her grandchildren from answering the door and 
telephone gave rise to probable cause to believe he was obstructing and 
delaying an officer, I.C. 3 18-705, conducting a lawful investigation. Additionally, 
the officers also had probable cause to arrest Araiza for false imprisonment, I.C. 
3 18-2901, or kidnapping, I.C. § 18-4501, based upon Ms. Mosqueda's statement 
to the police that Araiza would not let anyone answer the door. (Tr., p.19, Ls.7- 
12.) 
Upon Araiza's lawful arrest, Officer Clark asked Ms. Mosqueda if Araiza 
had any clothing that should go with him, and she led him to another bedroom 
and pointed out a coavacket and an unzipped white leather duffle bag in which 
drug paraphernalia was in plain view. (Tr., p.19, L.15 - p.21, L.15.) When the 
officer searched the open bag, he found watches and rings Araiza has stolen 
from the home, as well as more drug paraphernalia, and methamphetamine. 
(Tr., p.20, L.37- p.21, L.&.) 
E, Summary 
The entry into Ms. Mosqueda's home was justified under the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Upon entering the officers 
had probable cause to arrest Araiza. Accordingly, Araiza's methamphetamine in 
the white leather bag, which belonged to his mother, was not subject to 
suppression under the exclusionary rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Araiza's conviction and 
sentence by upholding the district court's order denying Araiza's motion to 
suppress. 
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